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Abstract—A new scalable ISP level system architecture to
secure and protect all IoT devices in a large number of homes
is presented. The system is based on whitelisting, as in the Man-
ufacturer Usage Description (MUD) framework, implemented
as a VNF. Unlike common MUD suggestions that place the
whitelist application at the home/enterprise network, our ap-
proach is to place the enforcement upstream at the provider
network, combining an NFV (Network Function Virtualization)
with router/switching filtering capabilities, e.g., ACLs. The VNF
monitors many home networks simultaneously, and therefore, is
a highly-scalable managed service solution that provides both the
end customers and the ISP with excellent visibility and security
of the IoT devices at the customer premises.
The system includes a mechanism to distinguish between flows
of different devices at the ISP level despite the fact that most
home networks (and their IoT devices) are behind a NAT and
all the flows from the same home come out with the same source
IP address. Moreover, the NFV system needs to receive only
the first packet of each connection at the VNF, and rules space
is proportional to the number of unique types of IoT devices
rather than the number of IoT devices. The monitoring part of
the solution is off the critical path and can also uniquely protect
from incoming DDoS attacks.
To cope with internal traffic, that is not visible outside the
customer premise and often consists of P2P communication,
we suggest a hybrid approach, where we deploy a lightweight
component at the CPE, whose sole purpose is to monitor P2P
communication. As current MUD solution does not provide a
secure solution to P2P communication, we also extend the MUD
protocol to deal also with peer-to-peer communicating devices.
A PoC with a large national level ISP proves that our
technology works as expected, identifying the various IoT devices
that are connected to the network and detecting any unauthorized
communications.
I. INTRODUCTION
IoT devices are strong enough to host malicious code
or become a zombie, but, for economic and technological
reasons, they do not have the means to protect themselves from
being hacked. Thus, the billions of IoT devices (estimates are
from 10 to 50 billion by 2020, 50% being consumer devices)
are fertile ground for many attacks of different kinds: DDoS
attacks, privacy infringing attacks, data leakage, and physical
break-ins. Several different systems and methods to provide
protection to IoT devices have been proposed in recent years
[1]–[6]. In this paper, we present an ISP level system that
protects the IoT devices in a large number of homes. This
effective, scalable system should be a key part of protecting
and stopping attacks on and from IoT devices.
The underlying property that distinguishes most IoT devices
from home computers, such as laptops, desktops, and hand-
held devices, is that in most cases an IoT device communicates
with a limited number (most usually very small) of pre-defined
domains. Furthermore, these devices, rarely if ever, go through
a firmware update. These characteristics have been exploited to
create a whitelist based protection methods for IoT devices. A
recent initiative that receives a lot of attention, both in industry
and academia, calls for IoT device vendors to provide a
Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) for their products [7].
These descriptions, called MUD files, consist of whitelists
describing the devices’ legitimate communication, specified
by the domain names of legitimate endpoints. Methods to
automatically learn and acquire the MUD file for a device
type have also been developed [8].
To protect an IoT device, given its MUD file, or any other
whitelist, it is necessary to resolve the domain names in the
list to get the corresponding IP addresses (which might vary in
different geographies and at different times), then to monitor
the device traffic ensuring it communicates only with these
IP addresses and complies with the MUD file (e.g., uses the
specific ports and protocols specified in the file). If a deviation
is detected, offending connections should be blocked and alerts
on suspicious activity are issued. Suggested implementations
of the MUD standard as well as other IoT protection systems,
implement these steps within the internal/local area network
(LAN), i.e., for home networks on the CPE, [1]–[3], [9]–
[15], though sometimes on a separate device. In this paper, we
provide a system architecture to implement these steps at the
ISP level. The system combines an off-path Virtual Network
Function (VNF) with the existing ISP’s on-path enforcement
capabilities. The VNF holds the MUD rules (where domain
names are already resolved to IP addresses) and monitors
a large number of home networks by these rules. Upon a
violation, the corresponding connection is blocked in one of
the ISP’s on-path routers or switches, e.g., using ACLs.
As home networks apply Network Address Translation
(NAT), implying all devices use the same IP address and port
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numbers are arbitrary, perhaps the major challenge when work-
ing outside the LAN is to distinguish between connections
originating from different devices. Our design overcomes this
difficulty by dynamically installing packet marking rules on
the home gateway router (often called a Customer Premise
Equipment or CPE), using its standard configuration protocol
TR-69 [16]. Marking is done on the DSCP header field (thus
not introducing extra overhead) only on packets originating
from IoT devices. Furthermore, marking rules are installed
only when the device first connects to the CPE.
The IoT protection architecture suggested here has several
advantages: First, it is not on the critical path of the traffic
as the VNF takes only a copy of the first packet of each
connection. Second, for any home whose CPE is managed
by the ISP (the vast majority of homes) no cooperation from
the client is necessary, the protection may be provided as a
service in one click on the ISP management unit. Third, our
system provides the customer and the ISP a complete view
of the devices in the network. This is achieved by retrieving
information from the CPE using TR-069 and identification of
the IoT devices using existing MUD files (or other whitelists)
installed for devices across the entire network. Moreover, the
customer can receive an alert for any device that connects
to its network. These views of customer devices are also
an important and helpful service for customer help service
at the ISP. Fourth, the number of rules held in the VNF
is proportional to the number of IoT device types (unique
MUD files), and not to the total number of IoT devices it is
monitoring; moreover, domain resolution is done in the VNF
once for all devices of the same type, thus reducing the load
on the DNS server and enable using more secure DNS servers.
The centralized, upstream location of the solution, observing
many home networks at once, holds a great promise as the
system can correlate traffic surges and patterns from multiple
homes to detect and mitigate outgoing DDoS attacks and other
global attacks. Furthermore, the system is situated at a good
point to stop additional attack vectors, such as attacks on (or
that come out of) the CPE itself1 or incoming DDoS attacks
on IoT devices and homes.
To cope with internal traffic, that is not visible outside
the customer premise, we suggest a hybrid approach, where
we deploy a lightweight component at the CPE, whose sole
purpose is to monitor such traffic. We extend the MUD
specification and its whitelisting capabilities to support P2P
communication in which IoT devices act as servers and their
users (e.g., another device within the local network) act as
clients. P2P communication is most common in intra-LAN
communication. Yet, our system also covers users’ remote
access (e.g., using a mobile phone), which can be granted
using port forwarding on the CPE, UPnP [17], or STUN
[18] with Hole-Punching [19]. We note that extending the
MUD protocol to support such communication, and then to
incorporate its monitoring and enforcement in the ISP level,
1Our system also monitors all connections that terminate in the CPE, as
the CPE itself is considered an IoT device
is of great importance since recently-reported botnets, like
MIRAI [20], targeted devices based on P2P communication.
Notice that as reported in Shodan [21], there are still many
IoT devices that are vulnerable. Besides covering more attack
vectors, such a hybrid system is beneficial to provide a certain
level of security even if one of its components fails.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we will discuss related work on MUD and IoT whitelisting.
Section III describes our ISP-level system, which includes a
virtual network function, whitelist enforcement component,
and communication with the CPE to ensure correct packet
marking. Section IV describes how we extend the MUD
specification to support P2P communication (either internal
traffic within the home network or P2P communication across
the Internet). Section V provides details on our implementation
and our PoC deployment with a large national-level ISP.
Concluding remarks are given in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
MUD (Manufacturer Usage Description) [7], has been offi-
cially approved to define IoT devices communication patterns
in order to reduce the attack surface on IoT devices. In this
standard, IoT vendors/providers are encouraged to provide
a MUD file consisting of access control rules that describe
the device’s proper communication behavior [22]. Recently,
Cisco announced that some of devices support MUD and
some vendors already defined MUD files [23]. The MUD
framework assume that the components at the network are
MUD controller, that process the MUD information, and the
router/switch that run ACL (using a whitelist approach). Thus,
in the home-network environment, it assumes that the CPE
deploys MUD.
In contrast, our system is deployed within the ISP network
and receives a copy of the traffic from a PoP router. As far as
we are aware, this is the only MUD solution that is deployed at
the ISP level. Moreover, all IoT security frameworks, including
the ones that do not use MUD or whitelisting at all, that we are
aware of (either from Academia or Industry) focus on solutions
within the CPE/LAN and not in the ISP level [1]–[6], [11]–
[13], [24].
MUD-based solutions are still incomplete, and there are
several recent works that focus on extending or implementing
MUD, some of them in SDN environment [25]–[27]. Important
issues that are yet to be addressed are dealing with IoT devices
that may be accessed directly by the owner mobile device(s)
(in a P2P manner), dealing with services behind a cloud bucket
(e.g., Amazon S3 bucket), where the exact bucket is specified
in an encrypted manner, and dealing with devices in which
the user can add apps/skills (such as a smart TV or Amazon
Echo). In this paper we extend MUD to handle P2P traffic.
III. NFV-BASED SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The system goal is to ensure that all packets from and to
an IoT device comply with the MUD file rules. This implies
that, for each packet , the system needs to decide whether it
conforms with a MUD file (or another form of a whitelist),
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and if not, to block the packet. The MUD enforcement has
thus two logical components, monitoring and enforcing. In
the whitelist monitoring (WLM), it is determined whether
a packet/connection complies with a whitelist/MUD file or
not; In the whitelist/MUD enforcement (WLE), based on the
output of the WLM component, the packet is either dropped or
permitted. While WLE must be on the traffic path observing
every packet originated or destined for IoT devices; the WLM
may be performed on a copy of the traffic, thus being off the
critical path. In our implementation WLM, is implemented as a
VNF that receives only a single packet of each connection, sent
from an IoT device, to decide whether the entire connection
should be permitted or blocked.
The control-plane in our implementation includes the
control-plane inside the VNF as well as control communica-
tion with other control-planes, such as on the CPEs and other
components, see Figure 1. We next describe its operation when
the IoT devices act as clients initiating connections to their
cloud services (or other services). We assume that customers
connect to the ISP network through a CPE with a unique
IP address (which can change over time). As in the typical
setting, the IoT devices reside behind a NAT (performed by
the CPE), implying that outside the customer network all
outgoing packets appear to come from the same IP address
with arbitrary ports. We further assume that IoT devices have
a MUD file (or another readily-available whitelist). Notice that
our framework also provides the infrastructure to learn a new
MUD file of devices whose manufacturer did not provide one.
The method itself of learning the MUD files from deployed
IoT devices in the network is out of the scope of this paper.
We note that there are tools like MUDgee [8] that create a
MUD file from traffic traces of labeled devices in the lab.
However, it is not straightforward to apply these tools on
unlabeled IoT devices, that are deployed in the wild, and
one has no control over their operations (specifically, one
cannot actively try specific device functionality and observe
the resulting traffic). Nevertheless, we note that the centralized
view of our system is better in learning the regular behaviour
of IoT devices (i.e., generating a MUD file), since it can
observe and analyze multiple devices of the same type.
A. Data Plane
The data-plane has three major parts: the customers’ private
networks, the ISP network, and the VNF, which monitors
traffic and issues alerts (on suspicious traffic). We assume that
a MUD file, containing a whitelist for each IoT device type M ,
is given as a set of domains WLDM , that correspond to IP ad-
dresses WLM with which the device is allowed to communi-
cate; namely, WLM =
⋃
D∈WLDM {L ∈ DNS-response(D)}.
Moreover, WLM may contain more parameters (such as port
numbers) as defined by the MUD protocol specification. We
note, however, that our framework does not support Layer-2
parameters (such as MAC address) as these are not visible
outside the LAN.
1) Operations within the Customers’ Network: IoT devices
that are monitored by the framework are oblivious to its
ISP 
Cloud 
Server
CPEA
ISP
Cloud
CPEB
DNS
WLM
VNF
WLE
ACS
Fig. 1. Illustration of our Framework. The WLM’s data plane is marked
with solid lines, while the WLM’s control plane is marked with dash lines.
In this illustration, the WLM VNF protects two LANs that communicate with
the Internet through two CPEs. Both LANs have a camera installed in them,
which connects to the same service in the cloud. The WLM VNF contains
whitelists/MUD files for all IoT devices in the system. In this particular case,
it verifies that both cameras communicate only with endpoints within their
whitelist/MUD file.
existence, and no special configuration needs to be done at the
IoT device level. However, to be able to distinguish packets
coming from different IoT devices at the ISP level, CPEs
that are connected to our framework should mark packets
originating from different IoT devices with different values
in the DSCP field in the IP packet header. DSCP marking
(by source MAC address) is a standard feature in most CPEs
available today and requires only CPE configuration. We
note that packets originating from non-IoT devices (such as
desktops, laptops, or mobile phones) are not marked with a
special DSCP value (and maintain the original value used by
the device; 0 in most cases). A newly-connected device, for
which there is no indication whether it is an IoT device or
not, is marked and tracked until such a decision is made.
The remote CPE configuration (namely, the assignment of
a DSCP value for each device) is part of the control plane’s
operations as described in Section III-B.
2) Operations within the ISP network: After transmitted
from the customer premise, packets are sent through a se-
quence of routers within the ISP network, towards their
destination. Our framework requires that one router along
this route will copy outgoing packets from all monitored
customer premises and send them to the VNF. This can be
done either using port mirroring or installing a specific filter
on the ISP’s router. Moreover, the VNF needs only one packet
from each outgoing connection2. In case the router supports
the OpenFlow protocols, for example, this can be done by
dynamically installing a filter on every observed connection.
We note that packets are copied (and not routed) from the
router to the VNF, thus our VNF does not reside on the critical
path of the packets and does not induce extra delay or other
performance penalties on the traffic.
The VNF may issue either alert on abnormal behavior or
access-control list (ACL) filters to block malicious traffic in the
2We define a connection in this context as all packets that share the same
〈src_ip, src_port, dst_ip, dst_port, protocol〉 tuple.
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WLE. The ACLs can be either specific (e.g., block a specific
connection; in most cases, both directions of the connection
are blocked simultaneously) or aggregated (block all traffic
to/from specific address/network; this is especially appealing
in case of DDoS attack where many malicious connections are
created simultaneously).
It is important to notice that our WLM VNF observes only
traffic originating from an IoT device (and therefore, is marked
by the CPE). Since most known attack traffic is bidirectional
(e.g., for TCP traffic connections, at least acknowledgments
are sent) , our WLM VNF can detect it. As mentioned before,
our WLE component blocks traffic from both directions.
3) Operations within the VNF: Packets received by the
VNF are treated by their DSCP value, where classification
actions are mapped to the multiple match-action table (mMT)
model (e.g., as in OVS [28]). The exact mapping is described
in Figure 2; table rules are updated by the control plane
(see Section III-B). Specifically, we distinguish between the
following cases:
Unmarked packets: Packets that have a DSCP value of 0 (or
another commonly-used value) were originated from a device
that is not an IoT device, and therefore, is not monitored by our
framework, implying our VNF should discard these packets.
Marked packets of an identified IoT device: When a device
joins a customer network, the CPE is configured to mark all
its packet with a certain value. Through our control plane,
we try to obtain the MUD file corresponding to this device
and associate it with its specific type X . This implies that
one should only verify that the packets comply with the
corresponding MUD file/whitelist. This is done by matching
the header of the packet to WLX (e.g., verifying that the
destination IP address is in the whitelist). In case any deviation
is detected, an alert is issued and/or the connection is blocked
in the WLE.
Marked packets of an unidentified device: In case no
MUD file exists, we collect all of the device DNS queries
and all the endpoints the device is communicating with. This
information is sent to the control plane that analyzes this
information and decides which further actions should be taken.
See Section III-B2 for more details.
We note that due to technical reasons, there might be a
gap between the time a device joins a customer’s network and
the time the corresponding CPE starts marking its packets. In
order not to treat these first packets as unmarked, we configure
the CPE to have a default proprietary DSCP value for all
packets originating from the CPE. All such packets are treated
as marked packets of an unidentified device, and the VNF
associates them with the recently joined device (if only one
such device exists). See Section III-B3 for more details.
It is important to notice that we store only one whitelist
(or MUD file) per IoT device type (namely, all IP cameras
of a specific model are monitored with a single whitelist in
memory, regardless of their number). Specifically, if there are
21 commonly-used DSCP values [29], C customers in the
framework, each with di IoT (or unidentified) devices, and
P whitelist/MUD-file, each with pj entries (e.g., legitimate
Table Match Action
0 DSCP value is drop
commonly-used
otherwise goto Table 1
1 source IP address is apply unique metadata,
of a customer goto Table 2
2 Meta-data, DSCP value unidentified device:
send to controller
identified device (type
X): goto Table X
X≥3 destination IP in WLX drop
(dest port, protocol) in WLX drop
otherwise Output 1
Fig. 2. Our pipelined match-action implementation. An application that deals
with traffic that violates the whitelist (e..g, generates ACL and sends it to the
WLE) is connected to Output 1. In case the number of types exceeds the
number of available tables, several types can reside on the same table, by
applying a meta-data value to distinguish between them in Table 2. Counters
of filters in Table 2 present per-device activity of each customer.
destination IP address, port number, etc.), then the total
number of filters required to implement the entire data-plane
is 23+
∑C
i=1(di+1)+
∑P
j=1(pj+1). Furthermore, all update
events (such as a change in the external IP address of a
customer, new device has joined a customer’s network, a
profile has a new legitimate IP address, or a device is identified
as a non-IoT device) requires a single filter update (in a single
table within the pipeline).
B. Control Plane
The control plane operations are divided into the following
tasks that are executed periodically, when a new customer
joins the framework, or when a new device joins an existing
customer’s network (namely, a new device is connected to the
network for the first time).
1) Maintaining data plane’s whitelists: The first task of the
control plane is to retrieve, for each IoT type M , the whitelist
WLM from the given domain list WLDM that is specified
within its MUD file.
One possibility is by looking at the DNS responses to the
DNS queries it already tracks. However, this implies that both
traffic directions should be monitored (sometimes this is not
feasible) and the whitelist is prone to contamination, e.g., by
DNS poisoning attacks, as the DNS response might be bogus.
We chose an alternative way of performing active DNS
queries of the domains in all the WLD lists. This is done
periodically (every few minutes) to keep with changes in IP
addresses. Moreover, upon the detection of communication
of IoT device of type M to an unidentified endpoint, DNS
queries of all WLDM are immediately triggered. This is done
to verify that IP addresses did not change since the last active
DNS query and thus eliminating false positives alerts. We take
extra care to avoid learning malicious IP addresses due to
DNS poisoning, by performing the DNS queries to a secure
DNS server (such as OpenDNS or Quad9) that is immune to
such attacks. It is important to notice that since our WLM
is monitoring a large number of home networks, active DNS
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queries are done once for every IoT type (and not for every
IoT device), thus reducing the load on the DNS server.
2) Analyzing traffic of unidentified devices: Recall that for
devices without MUD files, the control plane receives the
list of domains and endpoints the device communicates with.
The control plane compares (in an efficient manner) this list
of to all known whitelists/MUD files. If the device matches
a whitelist of some IoT device type X , we associate these
marked packets with X by rewriting the corresponding rule at
Table 2 to point to Table X (see Figure 2) and by that ensuring
that the device continues to comply with WLX .
Otherwise, the device is either an IoT device that has never
been seen before (and therefore a new whitelist is created for
it) or is not an IoT device. A copy of the traffic is sent to a
control application, that identifies if the device is IoT or not
IoT (using techniques such as in [30]). If the device is a new
IoT device with no MUD file, we send the traffic (or part of the
traffic) to a control application that algorithmically learns the
whitelist corresponding to the device. As mentioned before, the
system described in this paper provides only the infrastructure
for MUD file generation and the exact algorithmic way to do
so (e.g., by variation of [8]) is out of scope. Finally, after a
MUD file is provided, we install the corresponding whitelist
on a separate Table X ′, and associate the device with X ′. If
the device is not an IoT device, the control plane instructs
the CPE to remove the DSCP mark from the device’s packets,
and therefore, all subsequent packets will arrive at the VNF
unmarked (see Section III-B3).
3) Remotely Configuring CPEs: One of the most important
parts of the control plane is the communication between the
VNF and the CPE, to configure the latter. Such a configu-
ration can be done in various ways, depending on the CPE
capabilities. However, in the vast majority of cases, the CPE
supports the TR-069 protocol for its remote configuration and
ISPs use this protocol to configure the CPE connected to their
network. Thus, our description will focus on this protocol.
Similar operations (and configurations) can be done using
SNMP and proprietary management protocols. We note that
once configuring a CPE, this configuration remains persistent
(unless it is factory reset).
TR-069 [16] is a client-server protocol, where the CPE
acts as a client and periodically initiates connections to an
Auto-Configuration Server (ACS). When a connection is es-
tablished, the ACS sends configuration requests to the CPE,
which are executed one by one. The ACS also exposes a north-
bound interface, so that management tools and applications
can communicate with it. Thus, our VNF, like any other TR-
69–based application, communicates with the ACS (in our
case, the ISP’s ACS), which in turn, passes the requests to
the CPE. An important feature of TR-069 is the ability to set
a specific parameter for “active notification”. In such a case,
if the parameter has been modified by an external cause (a
cause other than the ACS itself), the CPE initiates a connection
immediately to the ACS and notifies it on the parameter
change. We will use this feature later to detect new devices that
join the customer’s network. The TR-069 supports data models
that represent the entities that need to be configured. CPEs are
modeled using the Internet Gateway Device (IGD) Data Model
(TR-98) [31] and Device Data Model (TR-181) [32], and our
VNF uses only mandatory parameters within these models.
Our VNF initiates configuration requests upon the following
events:
New customer is added to the network: The external IP
address of the customer is extracted (so that the VNF can
identify connections from that customer). In addition, the
respective TR-98 parameter is set to “active notification”, so
that future changes to the customer’s external IP address will
be reported automatically. Moreover, the VNF extracts basic
details on all hosts that are connected to the CPE, and for
each host, it adds a mapping between its MAC address and a
DSCP mark.
Also, it adds a default DSCP mark (see Section III-A3) and
sets active notifications for the number of connected hosts (to
detect hosts that join the customer’s network).
Finally, in many settings, devices that are connected to the
network are configured (through DHCP) to use the CPE as
their DNS resolver. This implies that each DNS request is
terminating in the CPE, which, in turn, issues another DNS
request to ISP’s DNS resolver, if needed. This implies that
DNS requests arrive at the CPE unmarked. Since our data-
plane tracks DNS queries, and since it is important to associate
each query with the device that issued it, we change this
configuration, so that each device communicates directly with
the ISP’s DNS resolver.
An external IP address is changed: Recall that this parameter
is marked for active notification so that as soon as this
happens, the CPE notifies the ACS (and then our VNF) on
this change. The VNF then updates its internal state to monitor
connections/packets from the new external IP address rather
than the old one (namely, in Table 1 of the pipeline described
in Figure 2).
New device joins the network: As the number of hosts
connected to the CPE is marked for active notification, the
VNF is notified immediately upon such an event. Then, basic
details of the device (such as its MAC address, hostname, the
medium of connection, etc.) are extracted from the CPE, and
the CPE is configured to mark all packets transmitted from
this device. The VNF is configured to monitor these packets
as well as to associate all packets with default mark to this
device (to compensate on the time until the DSCP mark comes
into effect).
As MUD files are specified by IoT devices through DHCP,
we check the specific DHCP option (available in the Device
data model) for the URL of the MUD file. If such exists,
we check if the MUD file is already installed in the VNF
and start monitoring the device by associating it to the correct
table (see Table 2 in Figure 2). If the MUD file is not installed,
we download, parse, and install it as a new table in the VNF.
When no MUD file is specified, all packets transmitted from
the new device are marked packets of an unidentified device.
We note that we consider a device as new only on the first
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time it connects to the CPE. If the device disconnects from
the network and re-connects again, the CPE still lists it under
its hosts (as inactive hosts), implying DSCP marks are already
available, and no further action is required.
A device is classified as a non-IoT device by the VNF:
In this case, the DSCP mark on packets transmitted for this
specific device should be removed, so that the VNF will stop
monitoring the device by discarding the unmarked packets.
This is done by setting the DSCPMark within the respective
classification object to value -1, indicating that the CPE should
not change the DSCP value of packets.
IV. EXTENDING MUD FOR P2P COMMUNICATION
One important limitation of MUD files is that it does not
cover cases where the IoT device is a server and its users act
as clients, whose IP addresses can change frequently. Such
P2P communication is common when the IoT device and
its users are in the same LAN (namely, the same customer
network) or when a low latency connection between the device
and its users is required (e.g., for improving QoS of a video
streaming): In our study, of IoT traffic logs [33], [34] , [35]
and IoT devices in our lab, out of 42 IoT devices, five IoT
devices3 and one IoT alarm system act as servers. We note that
IoT P2P communication is less frequent nowadays, as most
IoT devices communicate with their users through a proxy
in the cloud (and are covered by our NFV-based solution as
described in Section III). Yet, recent devastating IoT attacks
(such as Mirai [20]) targeted exactly such devices.
In most cases, users access IoT devices through a dedicated
application, and therefore, we will use the term IoT app to
refer to these users and distinguish them from users of our
security system. Furthermore, the device on which the IoT
app is installed is called IoT app device (IAD).
The main problem of MUD for P2P communication is
that the IoT app that is allowed to access a certain IoT
device, is typically not allowed to access all IoT devices
of the same type (e.g., user of a camera of type X should
not access other cameras of type X that it does not own).
Thus, without additional mechanisms, the device manufacturer
cannot specify in the MUD file any details on the IoT app.
One common approach to cope with that, similar to what was
shown in [26], is to allow incoming traffic from any IP in the
internet (i.e., "*"); naturally, such a whitelist has close-to-zero
precision.
We have taken a different approach and extend the MUD
specification to allow a secondary virtual manufacturer (SVM),
whose sole purpose is to deal with P2P communication.
Notice that this virtual manufacturer may deal with all P2P
communication in the network (regardless of the manufacturer
of IoT device). Adding such a secondary virtual manufacturer
requires a minimal change in the specification and minimal
cooperation from the primary (physical) manufacturer: In the
3The devices are Belkin Wemo switch, Belkin Wemo Motion Sensor,
Motorola Hubble, TP-Link Day Night Cloud camera, and Samsung Smart
Cam. All these cameras use STUN [18] to allow incoming connections to the
home networks, as the cameras are typically behind NAT.
MUD file, which the primary manufacturer provides to the
WLM (often called MUD manager in this context), it should
specify that its device supports direct connection. This can be
done by inserting a unique placeholder (in our implementation,
$owner-unique-domain$) to the file, e.g., by adding the
following rule:
"ipv4": {
"ietf-acldns:src-dnsname":
"$owner-unique-domain$",
"protocol": 6
}
Upon encountering the unique placeholder, the WLM
permanently replaces it with the specific domain (or domains)
provided by the SVM, as will be described next. Upon such
replacement, the WLM is left with a regular MUD file and
can continue its normal operations without any change.
A. Deploying WLM and WLE for P2P Communication
As P2P communications include local traffic and, in any
case, the MUD file of every device (and not every device
type) is different, the WLM and WLE should be deployed
within the Customer Premise Equipment (CPE); namely, the
home gateway router. This can be done by installing a software
on the CPE device, which can run either as a process or as
a container in this machine. CPE-based solution implements
WLM and WLE on the same box, but can be deployed as
different processes, where WLE can sometimes use available
hardware to enhance its performance.
CPE-based deployments have the best visibility as it can
observe and block unauthorized internal traffic between de-
vices in the same network. Moreover, as typically there is
no NAT between the CPE and the IoT devices, it is easy to
associate packets to their corresponding IoT device (no need
for DSCP marking, etc.). On the other hand, WLM must be
able to resolve all domain names in all its MUD files to
maintain the correct mapping to IP addresses. This can be
done either by extracting the addresses from DNS responses
(which, in turn, requires deep packet inspection of packets and
incurs additional overhead) or periodically performing all the
required DNS queries.
Recall that we envision a hybrid deployment, which has
CPE-based component for P2P and internal communication
of IoT devices and NFV-based component for all other traffic,
thus achieving the best of both worlds. See Fig. 3. For IoT
devices that have both types of communication, the whitelist is
spread across the two components, which might cause conflicts
in a naive implementation: connections that are approved by
the whitelist in the CPE are later examined by the NFV-based
WLM and are blocked. To avoid such conflict, we make sure
that the CPE-based WLE component reset the DSCP value of
all packets matching its whitelist (implying they will not be
inspected or blocked by the NFV-based components).4
4This is done in two steps: the WLE at the CPE marks the packets by
a designated DSCP marking, and the CPE, as instructed by the NFV-based
WLM through TR-69, reset the DSCP marks of such packets regardless of
their source MAC address.
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Fig. 3. Illustration of our framework, where WLM&E component in the
CPE is responsible on P2P and local communication, while the VNF-based
WLM is responsible for all other communication. In this illustration, the same
camera is installed in two homes, where IADC (IADD) connects directly
to the camera at CPEA (CPEB). A whitelist with the IP address of IADC
(IADD) is installed in CPEA (CPEB). A single whitelist in the VNF-based
WLM monitors all other communications for both cameras.
B. The Secondary Virtual Manufacturer (SVM)
The SVM is responsible for generating specific domain
names for IADs and keeping a correct mapping between
these domain names and their corresponding IP addresses.
The main challenge is that, typically, IADs’ IP addresses are
changing very frequently (e.g., when the IAD is a mobile
device and it moves between networks) implying the SVM
should track the relevant IADs and update the corresponding
mapping. In a nutshell, this is done by installing an SVM
tracking application on the IAD, which consistently reports
the IP address of the IAD (and other metadata). This data is
sent to the SVM’s mapping service (deployed in the cloud)
which updates the DNS record that maps between the IAD’s
IP address to a unique domain. We note that, as we work with
DNS, changes in IP addresses do not cause any change in the
normal operations of the WLM, which include domain name
resolutions and coping with DNS changes.
Specifically, in our implementation, the SVM owns a parent
domain and given each IAD a unique randomly-generated sub-
domain under this domain. The SVM maintains the authorita-
tive DNS server for the parent domain (and hence, all its sub-
domains) to ensure that changes to DNS records, generated
by the SVM’s mapping service, are reflected in subsequent
DNS queries. Yet, one major issue that can be caused due
to this system architecture outdated resolution due to stale
cached records in one of the DNS revolvers. This problem can
be circumvented in standard techniques that include adding
random value as a sub-domain so that each DNS query will
bypass all caching mechanisms or pointing the WLM to the
SVM’s authoritative DNS server. The authoritative DNS
server will then remove the random value and return update
answer.
The most involved operation of the SVM is when a new
user sign-up with the service, which is Illustrated in Fig. 4.
A user who wants to use this protection needs to install the
SVM tracking application and create an account with the SVM
first. To enable two-factor authentication, users are required to
Tracking 
Application 
CPE
WLM&E
SVM 
Mapping Service
DNS
Server
MUD-URL
Request MUD File
2FA link/PIN (via SMS or email)
2FA response
Tracking metadata, including IP
Subdomain X is generated
Add record with X and IPMUD file with 
$owner-unique-domain$=X  
Fig. 4. Illustration of the sign-up process of a IAD with the SVM and the
corresponding CPE. The sign-up process must be completed when the IAD
is connected through the CPE.
provide either an email address and/or phone number. During
the sign-up process a new unique sub-domain and identifier
to the account are generated. To correlate the newly-correlated
account with a specific LAN, we require that the SVM tracking
application will be connected, in the first time, during that
LAN. The operations continue in the following steps, where
the SVM tracking application acts as a (virtual) IoT device,
while the SVM mapping service acts as its manufacturer:
(i) The SVM tracking application broadcasts a MUD URL,
which includes the SVM parent domain and the identifier of
the newly created account; (ii) The WLM fetches this MUD
URL by contacting its manufacturer as specified in the URL.
This request goes to the SVM’s mapping service; (iii) The
SVM’s mapping service extracts the account identifier and
initiates a two-factor authentication with the user, using the
email address and/or phone number provided when the account
was created; (iv) Upon successful completion of the two-factor
authentication, the mapping service replies to WLM with the
MUD file that includes the account unique domain (namely,
the value of $owner-unique-domain$); (v) The WLM
extracts this unique domain from the MUD file, replaces all
pending MUD files with $owner-unique-domain$, and
save the domain name for later usage.
We note that after an account is created, the SVM tracking
application reports to the SVM mapping service whenever
the external IP address of the IAD is changed (or every 15
minutes, as a keep-alive message). The message sent includes
the account identifier, the unique domain, the external and
internal IP addresses. If there is a change, the mapping
service simply updates the corresponding DNS record in the
authoritative DNS server. See a description of these operations
in Fig. 5.
C. Dealing with Internal traffic
When the IoT app is in the same LAN as the IoT device,
mapping to IP addresses is not required, and instead one
can use other information available within the LAN to define
whitelist rules in the MUD file (e.g., the IAD’s MAC address).
This can be generated in exactly the same process as described
above, with an additional place-holder. Note however that
in some cases, mostly in the presence of extenders within
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Tracking metadata, including IP
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DNS UPDATE  of X with IP
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Fig. 5. Illustration of the messages sent after the initial sign-up process.
Notice that the IoT device itself is oblivious to the system and continues its
operation without any change.
the LAN that rewrite MAC addresses, the IAD’s internal IP
address is needed; in this case, we configure the tracking
application to send both internal and external addresses and
configure two DNS records for that IAD. We note the case
where communication between different IoT devices in the
same LAN should be monitored was recently solved in [25].
Reducing the surface of the attack also inside the LAN is
extremely important, since there are many attacks that abuse
local devices to internally attack IoT devices [36], or to leak
data from them [37].
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND POC DETAILS
We have implemented our system, and deployed a proof-
of-concept in a large national-level ISP network.
Specifically, the data-plane was implemented using Open
vSwitch (OVS) version 2.8.1 [28] with OpenFlow 1.3. The
control plane was implemented as applications (in Python)
over Ryu—a common open-source OpenFlow controller [38].
Our implementation leverages on both the caching capabilities
of OVS, its supports of DPDK, and the pipelined architecture
of OVS and OpenFlow, where packets traverse multiple tables,
each contains several rules before they are classified.
DNS traffic and traffic from unidentified devices (namely,
devices with no corresponding MUD file) is sent to the
controller, on top of which there is an application that tries to
decide whether an unidentified device is an IoT device or not,
to match unidentified device activity with an existing MUD
file, to derive new whitelists, and to continue monitor changes
in whitelists. Identified devices’ traffic that is destined for IP
addresses not within the whitelist/MUD file is forwarded to
another application, which re-verifies that the traffic is indeed
legitimate and issues an alert to the customer and an ACL
to ISP, which can block this specific connection. The latter
application communicates with the applications on top of the
controller (e.g., to force active DNS queries) using RESTful
APIs. We have also used the built-in OVS counters to track
the activity on each IoT device and present it to the customers
and the ISP.
We note that while we have implemented and tested our
solution with OVS, as the solution is OpenFlow based and
does not use any proprietary fields of OVS, one can easily
migrate it to use any (physical or virtual) switch that supports
OpenFlow 1.3 and above.
In our PoC deployment, we do not have access to the ISP’s
ACS servers. Thus, we have deployed our own ACS server,
running open-source GenieACS 1.1 [39], and configured the
CPEs to communicate with it. As GenieACS does not support
active notification setting yet, we have shortened the inform
interval and manually refresh the corresponding TR-98 fields,
to capture the monitored events (mainly, new device joins the
customer’s network for the first time, or a new port is opened
in the CPE). Our VNF communicates with GenieACS through
GenieACS’s north-bound interface.
We have four VTech NB-403 CPEs, running for several
months in different locations within the ISP network. The ISP
routes all traffic to/from these CPEs through our VNF, which
runs as a virtual machine on top of one of the ISP’s VMware
ESXi hypervisors.
As for the extension to deal with P2P communication,
we have implemented the tracking application and installed
it with dozens of volunteers and checked some properties
of the solution. We highlight here some observation from
this experiment: First, DNS records were updates 15 times
a day on average (with a maximum of 40 times). DNS record
changes happen when IAD is switching between a WiFi and
cellular connections or between different WiFi networks. On
the other hand, the same IP address might belong to many
records (namely, when IADs using the same WiFi networks
or the same cellular provider, in case that provider use Carrier-
Grade NAT [40]); this implies that users within the same
network of the IAD might bypass our security mechanism
(or any other MUD-based solution). Finally, in some cases
DNS records must contain more than one IP address, since in
some enterprise networks, due to load-balancing of outgoing
connections, every IAD connection may receive different
(external) IP address.
VI. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented a system to provide IoT
security through a VNF deployed within the ISP. Our system
is built upon the MUD specification, in which each device
has a whitelist that describes its legitimate communication
patterns, and any deviation from this whitelist is blocked. Our
system may use a MUD file provided by the device (through
DHCP, as specified in the MUD RFC). It also provides the
infrastructure to derive MUD files from unidentified devices’
traffic (e.g., by running the algorithm described in [8]) and
to identify devices (that do not provide their MUD files by
themselves) by matching their traffic to existing MUD files
(or whitelists).
Furthermore, as our system is deployed in a centralized loca-
tion, monitoring a large number of home networks simultane-
ously, it is in an excellent position to detect global phenomena
such as outgoing and incoming DDoS attacks. Our future work
includes designing and deploying such mechanisms within our
system.
8
REFERENCES
[1] T. D. Nguyen, S. Marchal, M. Miettinen, H. Fereidooni, N. Asokan, and
A.-R. Sadeghi, “DÏoT: A Federated Self-learning Anomaly Detection
System for IoT,” in IEEE ICDCS, 2019, pp. 756–767.
[2] Y. Meidan, M. Bohadana, Y. Mathov, Y. Mirsky, D. Breitenbacher,
A. Shabtai, and Y. Elovici, “N-BaIoT: Network-based Detection of IoT
Botnet Attacks Using Deep Autoencoders,” IEEE Pervasive Computing,
vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 12–22, 2018.
[3] M. Miettinen, S. Marchal, I. Hafeez, N. Asokan, A. Sadeghi, and
S. Tarkoma, “IoT Sentinel: Automated Device-Type Identification for
Security Enforcement in IoT,” in IEEE ICDCS, 2017.
[4] Y. Meidan, M. Bohadana, A. Shabtai, J. D. Guarnizo, M. Ochoa, N. O.
Tippenhauer, and Y. Elovici, “ProfilIoT: A Machine Learning Approach
for IoT Device Identification Based on Network Traffic Analysis ,” in
ACM/SIGAPP SAC, 2017, pp. 506–509.
[5] A. Sivanathan, D. Sherratt, H. H. Gharakheili, A. Radford, C. Wije-
nayake, A. Vishwanath, and V. Sivaraman, “Characterizing and classi-
fying iot traffic in smart cities and campuses,” in 2017 IEEE Conference
on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS), 2017,
pp. 559–564.
[6] R. Doshi, N. Apthorpe, and N. Feamster, “Machine learning DDoS
detection for consumer internet of things devices,” in IEEE DLS, 2018.
[7] E. Lear, R. Droms, and D. Romascanu, “RFC 8520: Manufacturer Usage
Description Specification,” Internet Engineering Task Force, March
2019. [Online]. Available: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8520/
[8] A. Hamza, D. Ranathunga, H. H. Gharakheili, M. Roughan, and
V. Sivaraman, “Clear As MUD: Generating, Validating and Applying
IoT Behavioral Profiles,” in IoT S&P, 2018.
[9] McAfee, “ McAfee: Built-in Protection for Your Connected Devices,”
2019, https://securehomeplatform.mcafee.com/.
[10] F. Roberts, “Trend micro partners with asus to beef up iot security
in homes,” Internet of Business, Jan 2017. [Online]. Available:
https://internetofbusiness.com/trend-micro-asus-iot-security/
[11] E. Bertino and N. Islam, “Botnets and internet of things security,”
Computer, vol. 50, pp. 76–79, 02 2017.
[12] J. Habibi, D. Midi, A. Mudgerikar, and E. Bertino, “Heimdall: Mitigating
the internet of insecure things,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 4,
no. 4, Aug 2017.
[13] C. Kolias, G. Kambourakis, A. Stavrou, and J. Voas, “DDoS in the IoT:
Mirai and Other Botnets,” Computer, vol. 50, no. 7, pp. 80–84, 2017.
[14] Y. M. P. Pa, S. Suzuki, K. Yoshioka, T. Matsumoto, T. Kasama, and
C. Rossow, “IoTPOT: A Novel Honeypot for Revealing Current IoT
Threats,” Journal of Information Processing, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 522–
533, 2016.
[15] M. Özçelik, N. Chalabianloo, and G. Gür, “Software-Defined Edge
Defense Against IoT-Based DDoS,” in IEEE CIT, Aug 2017, pp. 308–
313.
[16] The Broadband Forum, “TR-069: CPE WAN Management Proto-
col,” 2018, Issue 1 Amendment 6. URL https://www.broadband-
forum.org/download/TR-069_Amendment-6.pdf.
[17] M. Boucadair, R. Penno, and D. Wing, “RFC 6970: Universal plug and
play (UPnP) internet gateway device-port control protocol interworking
function (IGD-PCP IWF),” Internet Engineering Task Force, 2013.
[Online]. Available: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6970
[18] J. Rosenberg, J. Weinberger, C. Huitema, and R. Mahy, “RFC 3489:
STUN - Simple Traversal of User Datagram Protocol (UDP) Through
Network Address Translators (NATs),” Internet Engineering Task Force,
2003. [Online]. Available: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3489
[19] B. Ford, P. Srisuresh, and D. Kegel, “Peer-to-peer communication across
network address translators.” in USENIX Annual Technical Conference,
General Track., 2015.
[20] C. Seaman, “Threat advisory: Mirai botnet,” Akamai Threat Advisory,
2016. [Online]. Available: https://www.akamai.com/us/en/multimedia/
documents/stateof-the-internet/akamai-mirai-botnet-threat-advisory.pdf
[21] “Shadon: The search engine for IoT devices ,” https://www.shodan.io/.
[22] M. Jethanandani, L. Huang, S. Agarwal, and D. Blair, “RFC
8519: Network Access Control List (ACL) YANG Data Model,”
Internet Engineering Task Force, June 2019. [Online]. Available:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8519/
[23] L. Su, “MUD is officially approved by IETF as an internet standard,
and cisco is launching MUD1.0 to protect your iot devices,” Cisco
Blogs, May 2019. [Online]. Available: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/
mud-is-officially-approved-by-ietf-as-an-internet-standard-and-cisco-
is-launching-mud1-0-to-protect-your-iot-devices
[24] J. Hong, A. Levy, L. Riliskis, and P. Levis, “Don’t talk unless i say
so! securing the internet of things with default-off networking,” in
IEEE/ACM IoTDI, April 2018, pp. 117–128.
[25] M. Ranganathan, “Soft MUD: Implementing Manufacturer Usage De-
scriptions on OpenFlow SDN Switches,” in International Conference on
Networks (ICN), 2019.
[26] A. Hamza, H. H. Gharakheili, and V. Sivaraman, “Combining MUD
Policies with SDN for IoT Intrusion Detection,” in IoT S&P, 2018.
[27] A. Hamza, H. H. Gharakheili, T. A. Benson, and V. Sivaraman,
“Detecting volumetric attacks on lot devices via sdn-based monitoring
of mud activity,” in Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Symposium on SDN
Research, ser. SOSR ’19. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2019, pp. 36–48.
[Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3314148.3314352
[28] B. Pfaff, J. Pettit, T. Koponen, E. Jackson, A. Zhou, J. Rajahalme,
J. Gross, A. Wang, J. Stringer, P. Shelar, K. Amidon, and M. Casado,
“The design and implementation of open vswitch,” in NSDI, 2015, pp.
117–130. [Online]. Available: http://www.openvswitch.org/
[29] Cisco Systems, Inc., Cisco Nexus 1000V Quality of Service Configura-
tion Guide, Release 4.0(4)SV1(3). Cisco Systems, Inc., 2016, ch. DSCP
and Precedence Values.
[30] A. Bremler-Barr, H. Levy, and Z. Yakhini, “Iot or not:
Identifying iot devices in a shorttime scale (technical report),”
https://www.dropbox.com/s/fkznax3dzqlf13l/IoTorNot-report.pdf.
[31] The Broadband Forum, “TR-098: Internet Gateway Device Data Model
for TR-069,” 2014, Issue 1 Amendment 2 Corrigendum 1. URL
https://www.broadband-forum.org/download/TR-098_Amendment-
2_Corrigendum-1.pdf.
[32] ——, “TR-181: Device Data Model for TR-069,” 2011, issue 2
Amendment 2. URL https://www.broadband-forum.org/download/TR-
181_Issue-2_Amendment-2.pdf.
[33] A. Sivanathan, D. Sherratt, H. H. Gharakheili, A. Radford, C. Wije-
nayake, A. Vishwanath, and V. Sivaraman, “Characterizing and classi-
fying IoT traffic in smart cities and campuses,” in 2017 IEEE Conference
on Computer Communications Workshops, INFOCOM WKSHPS 2017,
2017.
[34] I. Sharafaldin, A. Habibi Lashkari, and A. A. Ghorbani, “Toward
Generating a New Intrusion Detection Dataset and Intrusion Traffic
Characterization,” in 4th International Conference on Information Sys-
tems Security and Privacy, 2018.
[35] A. Shiravi, H. Shiravi, M. Tavallaee, and A. A. Ghorbani, “Toward
developing a systematic approach to generate benchmark datasets for
intrusion detection,” Computers and Security, 2012.
[36] G. Acar, D. Y. Huang, F. Li, A. Narayanan, and N. Feamster, “Web-
based attacks to discover and control local iot devices,” in Proceedings
of the 2018 Workshop on IoT Security and Privacy. ACM, 2018, pp.
29–35.
[37] A. Schiffer, “How a fish tank helped hack a casino,” 2017. [Online].
Available: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/
wp/2017/07/21/how-a-fish-tank-helped-hack-a-casino/?noredirect=
on&utm_term=.fb9aad71c166
[38] Ryu SDN Framework Community, “Ryu SDN Controller,” 2017.
[Online]. Available: https://osrg.github.io/ryu
[39] GenieACS Inc, “GenieACS - fast , lightweight TR-069 ACS,” 2019.
[Online]. Available: https://genieacs.com
[40] I. Livadariu, K. Benson, A. Elmokashfi, A. Dhamdhere, and A. Dainotti,
“Inferring carrier-grade nat deployment in the wild,” in IEEE INFOCOM
2018 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, April 2018, pp.
2249–2257.
9
